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Abstraet 
In this study we propose the standard modal logic KD43 as the logle govern-
ing expressions about Utopia. We define a formal construction corresponding 
to Utopian expressions In ordlnary language that we name utopian eonditionals. 
They possess the singular properties of admitting Strengthening of the Antecedent 
whlle possibly defeating the rule of Modus Ponens. Perhaps the most interesting 
aspect of this work is that, as far as the authors know, this is the first time a cate-
gory of expressions in the ordinary language corresponding to these two singular . 
properties is provided. 
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On the Logic for Utopia 
1 Introduction 
Usually, there are two properties that are given special attention when speaking of for-
malizing conditionals, Modus Ponen s and Strengthening of the Antecedent. One may 
wonder about the different characteristics entailed by the satisfaction or not of these 
two crucial properties. Indeed, these characteristics that are analysed over formal 
conditionals become adequacy conditions to determine which are the corresponding 
constructions in the ordinary language. 
Much study has been devoted to delineate the boundaries of the different con-
ditionals and the problem seems to turn more cryptic every time a new category is 
proposed. However, we can speak of three kinds of ordinary conditionals fer which 
there is a wide concensus with respect to their formalization: i. those used in seien-
tifie proofs are gene rally represented as strict conditionals (typically in an S5 context)1; 
ii. the so called defeasible eondítionals or conditionals for defeasible inference which 
have received much attention in the lA community (for example the works of Lehmann 
[1], Boutilier [4, 5, 6] and Alchourrón [3D; iii. David Lewis' eounterfaetuals [2] modeled 
as variable strict conditionals over a system of spheres. 
It is clear, for example, that the formalization of the conditional construction in sci-
entific proofs satisfies both Modus Ponens (MP) and Strengthening of the Antecedent 
(SA), while defeasible conditionals satisfy neither. In short, we obtain the following 
table: 
MP SA Conditional 
Ves Ves Scientific Proofs 
No No Defeasible Conditionals 
Ves No Counterfactuals 
No Ves ? 
It seems easy to find a formal construction that corresponds to the last category; 
namely, a conditional violating MP while validating SAo However, it is less obvious to 
determine whether there is a class of ordinary language conditionals corresponding 
to it. This is precisely what this paper addresses. We propose both, a class of 
expressions in the ordinary language and its formal representation, and demonstrate 
that they cumply with our desideratum. 
2 Utopian Expressions 
We take an utopian expression as an utterance about imaginary or quixotic state 
of affairs. We envisage the general form of an utopian expression as a conditional 
assertion if A then a, where A and a are statements denoting ideal situations or perfect 
1 This correspondance was indicated by Carlos Alchourrón in a personal comunication. 
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circumstances. In other words, we are thinking that in our conception of Utopia, we 
accept B whenever we accept A. Here is an example: 
If wars were replaced by ehess eompetitions then death and power would 
·not be related any more. 
A peculiar property of these expressions is that they admit ornamentation of their 
antecedent preserving its acceptability but becoming, in this process, less informative. 
Namely, the more specific the antecedent the less it says about the correlation with 
the consequent. 
However, the antecedent could be reinforced up to the extreme 01 ceasing to be 
utopian, or becoming contradictory. In such cases the utopian conditional is acceptable 
but meaningless, reflecting the inexistence of utopian situations where the antecedent 
holds. 
It is clear that we usually sustain an utopian express ion while realizing that actaulity 
does not behave accordingly. In other words, we can accept an utopian express ion 
and consider its antecedent as actual, while denying its consequent. The actual world 
is tipically a counter-example to our utterance about Utopia. In this study we embody 
the aboye interpretation into a formal language as an utopian eonditional. 
3 On the Logic for Utopia 
In this section we present a logic governing the utopian expressions commented in 
the previous section. We establish a correspondence between an utopían expression 
in the ordinary language and a formal construction in the modal logic KD43. Utopian 
expressions in our modal language become utopian conditionals. We take Kripke 
Models as the standard semantic theory for modallogic. Thus, we give semantics to 
sentences about Utopia by interpreting the accessibility relation between worlds as an 
ordering of idealism or perfeetion. We assume this relation to be an ordering beca use 
we insist that it should be transitive, serial and connected. We discuss this below. 
First we propose the standard modal logic KD43 as the underlying logic for Utopia. 
Then, we arrive at a definition of an utopian conditional guided by the intuitions we 
already presented. In this section we assume familiarity with classical propositional 
logic as welll as acquaintance with modal logics. We take L as the standard modal 
language. Upper-case letters A, B, e are used to denote arbitrary formulae in L. 
Speacking of semantic models we will denote with W the set of possible worlds, or 
points which are notated with greek letters 0:, (3, '. We refer to A-worlds meaning that 
such worlds satisfy the formula A. 
Deflnltlon 1 The modal logie KD43 is the smallest set S ~ L sueh that S contains 
CPL and the following axioms, and is elosed under the following rules of inference: 
K D(A:J B) :J (DA :J DB) 
O DA:J <>A 
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3 O(OA:) B) V O(OB :) A) 
4 DA:) ODA 
Nec From A ínfer DA 
MP From A :) B and A ínfer B 
US From A ínfer A' where A' is a substitution instan ce of A 
It ís well known that the logic KD43 is sound and complete with respect to the class 01 
transitive, connected and serial models. A model is transitive if its relation R satisfies 
Va, f3,¡((R(a, f3) 1\ R(f3,¡)) :) R(a,¡)) 
connected if 
Va, f3, ¡((R(a, f3) 1\ R(a, ¡)) :) (R(f3,¡) V R(¡, f3) V f3 = ¡)) 
and serial if 
Va3f3(R(a, f3)) 
This last condition corresponds to models with no dead ends, that is every world has 
access to 50 me world which may or may not be itself. 
Theorem 2 (Hughes and Cresswell 1984) The system KD43 is characterized by the 
class of transitive and connected mode/s, with no dead ends. . 
We already mentioned that our intuition behind the accessibility relation in our mod-
els should be an ordering of worlds reflecting their "distance"2 to Utopia. The only 
conditions we impose on this relation are transitivity, "weak" connectedness and no 
dead ends: if a world is farther from Utopia than another which is in turn farther than 
a third one, then the first is farther than the last; for any two accessible worlds either 
one is closer to Utopia than the other, or they are equally close; and, there is no 
world closest to Utopia. Each world considers that there is a world closer to Utopia 
than itself. However, there is a limiting case wherea "final" world has no option but 
choosing itself as the least distant to Utopia. Hence, combining all requirements we 
obtain that every world has access to Utopia. 
The resulting modal structure is a total preorder of clusters of worlds, where a 
cluster is a mutually accessible set of worlds3 • A different way of describing the modeí 
for Utopia is as possibly multiple ordered sequences of worlds, each sequence ranging 
from Hell to Utopia. Nothing forces a sequence to be finite; that is, inferno can be 
a possibly infinite chain of more and more sinister worlds, while Utopia a possibly 
infinite chain of paradise-Iike states of affairs. Our actual world could be anywhere in 
a sequence, presumably as far from Hell as from Utopia, depending on who designs 
the accessibility relation; we could take it as absolute in the Universe, or as reflecting 
the bellefs or desires of a particular agent. 
2This is not a mathematical distance but a metaphorical expresion 
3 Notice that a world In a cluster does not necessarily have access to itself. 
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It is notorious that the strict conditionals satisfy always, disregarding the underlying 
accessibility relation, the rule of Strengthening of the Antecedent: 
If o(A:) B) then D((A 1\ e) :) B) 
as the simple proof below shows: 
Proof: We want to prove D((A 1\ e) :) B), given that OCA :) B). 
We have to see that for every model M = (W, R,v) and for every o: E W, 
M I=a D((A 1\ e) :) B) 
iff for every {1 E W such that o:R{1, M F,6 (A 1\ e) :) B. 
By hypothesis, we have that M Fa OCA :) B), and so M F,6 A:) B 
then by SA of the material conditional M F,6 (A 1\ e) :) B. 
It is easy to sea that MP does not hold for strict conditionals for models that are not 
reflexive. A world can assert OCA :) B) while satisfying (AI\-,B) because it may not be 
accessible from itself. So strict conditionals over non-reflexive models are candidates 
to utopian conditionals. 
Even though satisfaction of SA and not MP are mandatory to match the notion we 
are pursuing, they are surely incomplete with respect to Utopian expressions, in at 
least one way. Not every world better than ours is sufficiently utopian. The conditional 
must hold from a certain point in our ordering of worlds up to Utopia, but not at every 
point. This motivates an attempt towards a definition of an utopian conditional that we 
will note as A > B: 
A> B =dfoO(A:) B) 
that is, it must be possible that the strict conditional comes true. 
It is easy to prove that our definiton of A > B satisfies the formal conditions we 
stated. It violates MP. 
Proof: We have to give a model M and a world a in the model such that: 
M I=a A > B and M Fa A but M ~a B. 
We propose M =< W,R,l > where W = {a,{1}, R = ((a,{1), ({1,p)}, 
lepo) = {0:,{1} 
l(PI) = {{1} 
l (Pi) = {} Vi > 1 
Then we have M I=a (Po > PI) and M Fa Po but M ~a PI' 
It satisfies SA: 
Proof: Take any model M and any world a in M, and suppose that M I=a A > B. 
We want to prove that for every other formula e, M i=a (A 1\ e) > B. 
If M I=a A > B then M Fa oD(A :) B). 
It implies that there is a world f1 such that aR{1 and M F,6 OCA :) B), 
if and only if for every world "( with {1 R"( we have M F'Y A :) B. 
Now, by SA of the material implication, for any formula e we have M I='Y (A 1\ 
e):) B. 
As the accessibility relation is transitive, aRf3 and f3R'Y implies aR"(, 
and then M Fa oO((A 1\ e) :) B). 
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Utopian conditionals express a fact about Utopia. It is natural to think of Utopia as 
a singular place, so no matter where we are,we should describe Utopía in the same 
way. Remarkably, our definition of an utopian conditional in KD43is locaf, namely, the 
truth conditions of an utopian conditional may vary depending on the world where the 
conditional is considered. However, given that KD43 structures are disjoint ordered 
sequences of worlds, whenever a conditional holds in a world, it automatically holds in 
every world in its sequence. Therefore, an utopian conditional is globafin a sequence. 
Clearly, the reason for it is that every world in a sequence has access to Utopia. We 
consider that a satisfactory model for Utopia should be a unique chain of worlds, as 
opposed to many disjoint components each reflecting distance to Utopia4. In such a 
connected model an utopian conditional becomes global: it is true in a world if and 
only if it is true in every world. 
Given that an utopian conditional is defined as a possibility of a strict implication, 
an utopian conditionals inherit the paradoxes affecting strict conditionals. 
DA :) (B > A) , V B E L 
and 
O-,A:) (A > B) , VB E L 
The first one asserts that if all accessible worlds satisfy A, then Utopia sanctions A. 
Hence, A does not need any other support to be considered utopian. Every B is 
irrelevant for A. The second is the dual version of the first, and can be interpreted as 
saying that if there are no accessible A -worlds, then A could not happen in Utopia. 11 
we sustain A as utopian anything at all becomes conceivable. 
An utopian conditional A > B holds non-vacuously, that is denoting the relationship 
in Utopia between antecedent and consequent, when the conditional A > -,B does not 
hold simultaneously. Actually, when A > B and A > -,B are both true, they indicate 
that there are no A-worlds in Utopia, or what is the same, that in every utopian state 
of affairs -,A holds. When both A > B and A > -,B are true, so is A > l.. and 
T > -,A. As indicated aboye, if A were utopian then anything could happen even 
inconsistencies. Since this can not be, we are left with -,A occurring in Utopia. 
In the same spirit, when the conditionals A > B and -,A > B are both validated, 
their significance reduces to assert that B holds at every world in Utopia. When none 
of the two conditionals A > B and A > -,B hold¡ it 101l0ws that among the A-worlds in 
Utopia sorne are B and sorne are -,B. 
Let's analyze how the discussion aboye and other peculiarities are translated in 
terms 01 models. 
M t= (A> B) /\ (-,A > B) 
This is the case when the best worlds in M are B-worlds. In this case, the antecedent 
A was not necesary to arrive to B. That is, B holds on its own, no matter whether A 
or not A . 
M t= (A > B) /\ (A > -,B) 
41n standard modallogic the requirement of total connectedness is not expressible, so this condition 
has to be specified extra-Iogically. 
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This is the case when the best worlds in M are ...,B-worlds. 
M 1= (...,A) > A 
This conditional is redl,Jced to ODA which asserts there is an accessible point such 
that every succesor validates A. The best worlds are A-worlds. 
M 1= ...,(A > 1.) 
This one demands the existence of an A-world among the best worlds in M. 
M 1= (.1. > A) , 'v' A E L 
This is valid no matter the model M under consideration. Formally it says OOT, and 
this is a theorem in our logic (recall that models for Utopia are serial). 
Another theorem is the Identity property of the conditional. 
MI=A>A ,V'AEL 
Every better world has to be either A or ...,A, which is a trivial requirement. 
Two other properties follow from our definition, Transitivity and Contraposition. 
M 1= (A > B) 1\ (B > e) :> (A > e) 
and 
M 1= (A > B) :> (...,B :> -,A) 
These are easily proved from the fact that they hold for strict conditionals. 
4 Concluding Remarks 
We have proposed the standard modal logic KD43 as the logic governingexpres-
sions aboutUtopia. That is, we have provided a logical calculus and semantics for 
utopian eonditionals. These eonditionals possess the singular properties of admitting 
Strengthening of the Antecedent while possibly defeating the rule of Modus Ponens. 
Perhaps, the most interesting aspeet of this work is that, as far as we know, this is the 
first time a eategory of expressions in the ordinary language eorresponding to these 
two singular properties is provided. This was a lacking category in the taxonomy of 
conditionals with respect to their behaviour towards the two properties. 
Even though the formal eonstruetion is very simple it seems to embody our intuitive 
concept of utopian expressions. The strength of the eharaeterization is probably given 
by the quite natural properties we imposed on the accessibility relation. 
This study may resemble the work on eonditionals of Alehourrón, Lewis, Boutilier 
and Lehmann (and surely many others). Indeed, we have made use of many resources 
proposad by them. For instanee, the analysis of properties like SA and MP as adequity 
eonditions, the faet that we give an intuitive reading of the aeeessibility relation and 
the differences between local and global conditionals. This paper can be seen as an 
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exercise of putting together some of the well known pieces of conditional logics in 
order to characterize a set of sentences in the ordinary language. The existen ce of 
such set was in doubt. 
We have said nothing about embedded or iterated utopian conditionals; that is, 
conditionals that have an utopian conditional as its antecedent or consequent. Our 
definition of an utopian conditional A > B admits A and B to be any formula in the 
modal language L. Undoubtedly, the logic handles embedded conditionals. What is 
less clear is whether there are utopian expressions in the ordinary language corre-
sponding to them. 
As Carlos Alchourrón5 has indicated an interesting avenue remains to be explored. 
He suggested a comparison with deontic systems, as they are governed by modallogic 
KD4. 
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On the Logic of Theory Change: 
Wr 
Contraction Without Recovery 
Abstract:The postulate of Recovery, among the six postulates for theory contrac-
tion, formulated and studied by Alchourrón, Gardenfors and Makinson has been the 
one that more controversies provoked. In this paper we show a contraction function 
that does not satisfy Recovery, but tries to preserve minimal change; and relate this 
contraction function with the AGM revision function. 
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